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Introduction
In this paper we characterize e cient contingent claims to future consumption consumption bundles in multiperiod economies with uncertainty, taking a wide range of market frictions into account, 1 such as dynamic market incompleteness, proportional transaction costs, short sales costs and restrictions, borrowing costs and constraints, taxes, and potentially other imperfections. An e cient consumption bundle is de ned as an optimal choice for at least one agent with Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and a concave, strictly increasing utility function. If a consumption bundle is ine cient, we compute the lower bound on its e ciency loss across agents with di erent preferences but given future endowment: this gives a measure of ine ciency that does not rely on a speci c utility function. It also allows us to de ne a measure of portfolio performance. We also show that the arbitrage bounds on a contingent claim cannot be tightened based on e ciency arguments without restricting preferences or endowments. We apply these results to commonly used trading and hedging strategies, and we provide examples of e cient strategies that become ine cient in the presence of market frictions, as well as examples of ine cient strategies that are rationalized by market frictions. Indeed, market frictions generally change and tend to shrink the set of e cient strategies, shifting investors away from diversi ed investment strategies into low cost strategies, and for large frictions into no trading at all.
In economies without any market imperfections, Dybvig 1988a provides a useful characterization of e cient consumption bundles, based on the unique positive linear pricing rule i.e. Arrow-Debreu price vector that prices traded securities in the absence of arbitrage. 2 A consumption bundle is e cient if and only if it provides at least as much consumption in cheaper states of the world, i.e. in states of the world with lower Arrow-Debreu prices. A new model is then developed, the payo distribution pricing model 1 There is already a substantial related literature that studies optimal portfolio and consumption problems with market frictions. Among others, Constantinides 1986, Davis and Norman 1990 , Du e and Sun 1990 and Dumas and Luciano 1991 for the bid-ask spread case, and Cvitanic and Karatzas 1993, He and Pearson 1991, and Tuckman and Vila 1992 for the short sales constraints case. However these studies take preferences as given and derive optimal solutions: they do not provide a characterization of the set of optimal solutions when preferences belong to a general class. Pelsser and Vorst 1996 performs some simulations to study the e ciency of portfolio strategies under transaction costs.
2 Ross 1982 and Peleg and Yaari 1975 also treat the incomplete market case.
PDPM, and the size of the ine ciency of a consumption bundle is measured by the di erence between its market price or the investment required to replicate it and the price of the cheapest consumption bundle with the same distribution -called its distributional price". Therefore a consumption bundle is e cient if and only if its market price is equal to its distributional price". This leads to a measure of portfolio performance based on the PDPM which, unlike previous performance measures based on mean-variance analysis, avoids making unrealistic assumptions about preferences and or the distribution of returns. In Dybvig 1988b the PDPM is used to analyze trading strategies that are commonly used by practitioners, such as stop-loss or lock-in strategies and rolled-over portfolio insurance. It is found, under a reasonable parametrization of securities returns, that these strategies have an ine ciency cost of the order of 0:5 per year, a substantial amount.
In order to obtain a price characterization of e cient consumption bundles, we rst characterize the opportunity set of available returns in arbitragefree economies with market frictions in terms of linear pricing rules. It is wellknown that in arbitrage-free frictionless economies with complete markets there exists a unique positive linear pricing rule that prices any contingent claim and the opportunity set of available consumption is a hyperplane see for instance Cox and Ross 1976 , Harrison and Kreps 1979 , Harrison and Pliska 1979 , Du e and Huang 1986 , and Back and Pliska 1990 . In this case, the shadow prices at the optimum -the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution -are the same for all agents. On the other hand, in economies with market frictions the pricing rule is generally not linear. However, for a wide range of market imperfections including dynamic market incompleteness, short selling costs and constraints, borrowing costs and constraints, and proportional transaction costs it can be shown that the pricing rule is sublinear 3 i.e. positively homogeneous and subadditive and that the opportunity set of available consumption is a convex cone see Jouini and Kallal 1995a and 1995b . This means that in such economies the pricing rule is the maximum of a family of underlying linear pricing rules, which can be interpreted as the di erent implicit shadow prices -the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution -for di erent potential agents. For instance, in incomplete markets each underlying linear pricing rule corresponds to a 3 A pricing rule is sublinear if x=x and x+yx+y; for all comsumption vectors x and y and all positive real number: martingale 4 measure of the price processes of traded securities normalized by a numeraire, and is associated to a possible ctitious" completion of the initial market as de ned by Karatzas et al. 1991 . In economies with bid-ask spreads, the set of underlying linear pricing rules is the set of martingale measures of all the processes that lie between the normalized bid and ask price processes of traded securities and that can betransformed into a martingale see Jouini and Kallal 1995a . In economies with short sales constraints, it is the set of probability measures that transform the normalized price processes of traded securities into supermartingales. Economies where short selling and borrowing are possible but costly, can be analyzed in similar terms and are consistent with our approach see Jouini and Kallal 1995b . However, economies where there are higher charges for odd lots, or other xed transaction costs, do not fall in this framework indeed, the positive homogeneity o f t h e pricing rule is violated.
This description of the opportunity set of available returns in economies with market frictions enables us to characterize e cient consumption bundles. If we denote by the sublinear pricing rule and by K the set of underlying pricing rules E ;we have c = maxfEc : E 2 Kg; and a contingent claim c is e cient if and only if it provides at least as much net consumption in cheaper" states of the world. However cheaper" is not dened with respect to the sublinear pricing rule but with respect to one of the positive underlying linear pricing rules E in K that prices" c; i.e. that satis es c = Ec: It also allows us to compute the size of the ine ciency of a contingent claim, i.e. the di erence between the investment it requires and the largest amount needed by any rational agent, with a given future endowment, to get the same utility level. We show that it is equal to the di erence between the investment it requires and the minimum investment necessary to obtain a claim with the same distribution or a convex combination of such claims the utility price". Even though the utility price" coincides with the distributional price" in the frictionless case, in general it is strictly smaller: this is because, due to the frictions, some distributions of consumption are ine cient. However, we show that the utility price" of a consumption bundle is the largest of its distributional prices" in the underlying frictionless economies. We also show that the largest amount needed by any rational agent with any future endowment to get the same utility level as with c is equal to the arbitrage bound c: Hence arbitrage bounds cannot be tightened based on e ciency arguments without restricting preferences or endowments. Also, in frictionless complete markets, hedging and investment decisions can be separated into two distinct stages: duplicate the liability to behedged and invest optimally the remaining funds. In the presence of market frictions, however, hedging and investment decisions are intimately related and cannot beseparated. Although perfect hedging duplication is not always optimal, we nd that strategies that minimize the cost of obtaining a payo at least equal to a given liability have a zero ine ciency cost. These results allow us to de ne a measure of portfolio performance that does not rely on mean-variance analysis and avoids the problems associated with it: see Dybvig 1988 a and , taking market frictions into account. A correct measure of portfolio performance must trade o the additional frictional costs of alternative investment strategies against their incremental bene t from diversi cation. Market frictions generally change and typically shrink the set of e cient strategies, shifting investors away from well-diversi ed investment strategies into low cost strategies, and when frictions are large enough into no trading at all. We also apply these results to economies with market frictions such as di erent borrowing and lending rates due to asymmetries of information, short selling costs and bid-ask spreads, and we evaluate the ine ciency of investment strategies commonly followed by practitioners. We observe trading strategies that become ine cient as bid-ask spreads are introduced. We also show that high borrowing costs, especially if they increase with leverage, can rationalize strategies such as stop-loss that are ine cient in frictionless markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a price characterization of e cient consumption bundles and a preferencefree characterization of their ine ciency cost which leads to a measure of portfolio performance, and we investigate tightening the arbitrage bounds. In section 3 we apply the results of section 2 to evaluate numerically the impact of some market imperfections on the e ciency of commonly used trading strategies. All proofs are in the appendix.
E cient trading strategies 2.1 The economy
We consider a multiperiod economy with a nite numberof dates and n equiprobable states of the world where investors have some initial wealth w 0 and some uncertain future endowment x in R n ; and maximize their expected utility of future consumption that occurs at the nal date T :We denote by the pricing rule, i.e. agents have t o p a y c units of initial wealth in order to obtain a consumption bundle c = c 1 ; : : : ; c n that gives the right t o c i units of consumption at the nal date T in each state of the world i = 1; : : : ; n : We shall make the following: Assumption 2.1 : i The pricing rule is sublinear, i.e. x = x and x + y x + y; for all x; y 2 R n and all nonnegative real number :
ii The pricing rule is arbitrage free, i.e. c 0 for any nonzero consumption bundle c = c 1 ; : : : ; c n such that c i 0 for all states of the world i = 1 ; : : : ; n :
iii The pricing rule satis es 1 = ,,1 = 1:
iv The pricing rule is nondecreasing, i.e. x y, for all x; y 2 R n such that x y.
Part i means that the price of a consumption bundle is proportional to the quantity purchased and that it is less expensive to purchase a portfolio of consumption bundles than to purchase each consumption bundle separately.
Note that this implies that c ,,c for any consumption bundle c indeed 0 = c , c c + ,c and 0 = 0, i.e. the price at which c can be bought is larger than or equal to the price at which it can be sold. Part ii means that there are no arbitrage opportunities, i.e. no free consumption bundles that are nonnegative in every state of the world and strictly positive in at least one. This is a minimum requirement for any model. Part iii means that the riskless asset can bebought and sold without any frictions and that the riskless rate is equal to zero. This assumption can be made with little loss of generality: indeed, it amounts to the normalization of all consumption bundles and their prices by a n umeraire, e.g. a consumption bundle that is strictly positive in every state of the world and that can be bought and sold without any frictions. Note that in an economy with riskless and risky assets, it is not necessary to take the riskless asset as a n umeraire and we can normalize by a risky asset as far as it is strictly positive in all the states of the world. If that risky asset can bebought and sold without any frictions, assumption iii is then satis ed and di erent borrowing and lending rates can be taken into account in this framework see Jouini and Kallal 1995b . Part iv is, for instance, satis ed by an equilibrium pricing rule. Indeed, no rational agent will accept to pay more for less.
In multiperiod economies where in order to transfer wealth from the initial date to the future agents can trade a nite number of securities, then c is the minimum cost of obtaining a payo equal to or larger than the contingent claim c in all states of the world. Note that in this case ,,c and c can also beinterpreted as arbitrage bounds on the price of c : indeed, investors would not pay more than c for c; and would not sell it for less than ,,c; since in both cases a better outcome can bereached through securities trading. If markets are complete and frictionless then is linear. On the other hand, if markets are dynamically incomplete, if borrowing is restricted or the borrowing rate is larger than the lending rate, if short selling securities is restricted or costly, or if there are bid-ask spreads i.e. proportional transaction costs then is sublinear as in Assumption 2.1 see Kallal 1995a and 1995b . This sublinear representation of the pricing rule is in fact the reduced form of multiperiod models encompassing a larger class of market frictions that includes taxes see Chen 1992 and various portfolio constraints, but excludes higher charges for odd lots or other xed transaction costs. We also have Proposition 2.1 : For any pricing rule satisfying Assumption 2.1 there exists a closed convex set K of underlying" linear pricing rules or riskneutral" probability measures E = e 1 ; : : : ; e n ; with e 1 + : : : + e n = 1; that are nonnegative, i.e. e i 0 for i = 1 ; : : : ; n ; and where at least one element E of K is strictly positive, 5 i.e. e i 0 for i = 1; : : : ; n ; such that c = maxfEc : E 2 Kg for all c 2 R n : A linear pricing rule E 2 K prices" c if it satis es c = Ec:
If markets are complete and frictionless then the set of underlying linear pricing rule K contains a unique element, and hence the set of feasible consumption fc 2 R n : c w 0 g is a h yperplane and the shadow price vector at the optimum -the vector of intertemporal marginal rates of substitution 5 It also means that K is the closure of the set of its strictly positive elements.
-is the same for all potential agents. On the other hand, if the markets are incomplete and or there are frictions such that the pricing rule is only sublinear as in Assumption 2.1, then the set of underlying linear pricing rule K contains more than one element, and the set of feasible consumption fc 2 R n : c w 0 g is only a convex cone. 6 In this case, there are di erent implicit shadow prices -the underlying linear pricing rules -for di erent potential agents. We now review four cases of multiperiod economies with frictions such that the pricing rule is sublinear and satis es Assumption 2.1.
Case 1 Incomplete Markets : If markets are dynamically incomplete then the set of underlying linear pricing rules K is the set of martingale measures of the traded securities normalized price processes see Jouini and Kallal 1995a , as well as Karatzas et al. 1991 and He and Pearson 1991 for the concept of least favorable ctitious completion".
Case 2 Bid-Ask spreads, i.e Proportional Transaction Costs : If the traded securities can be bought at a price the ask that is potentially higher than the price the bid at which they can be sold, then the set of underlying linear pricing rules K is the set of martingale measures of any price process between the normalized bid and ask price processes see Jouini and Kallal 1995a . Case 3 Short Sales Constraints and Short Selling Costs : If agents are subject to short sales constraints, i.e. if securities cannot beheld in negative quantities, then the set of underlying linear pricing rules K is the set of supermartingale measures of the traded securities normalized price processes. The case where short sales are not completely restricted but costly can betreated analogously by introducing shadow securities that cannot be held in positive quantities and have a higher expected return. see Kallal 1995b , as well as Dybvig and Ross 1986 for the two-period case.
Case 4 Di erent Borrowing and Lending Rates : If agents can borrow and lend at possibly di erent rates, net of default risk e.g. if asymmetries of information prevent goodborrowers from di erentiating themselves from bad ones, then the set of underlying linear pricing rules K is equal to the set of martingale measures of the traded securities normalized price processes, where the normalizing numeraire is any instantaneously riskless asset with a rate of return between the borrowing and the lending rate see Jouini and Kallal 1995b . Note that in cases 2, 3, and 4 markets might be dynamically complete and we still have more than one underlying linear pricing rule, i.e. di erent implicit shadow prices for di erent potential agents. Moreover, we shall make Assumption 2.2 : All the states of the world are e quiprobable 7 and agents have preferences of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern type: they maximize expected utility, and have a concave strictly increasing utility function. This means that agents prefer more to less, are risk-averse, and only care about the distribution of consumption. 8
E cient consumption bundles
A contingent claim and hence the minimum cost trading strategy that leads to it is e cient if there exists a rational agent for which it is an optimal choice, given his uncertain future endowment. This future endowmentwhich can be the result of the investor having written a contract contingent on the state of the world, or the result of earnings derived from human capital -i s t a k en as given in this analysis. More formally, w e propose De nition 2.1 : A contingent claim c 2 R n is resp. strictly e cient, given an uncertain future endowment x 2 R n ; if there exists an initial wealth w 0 and a utility function u 2 U resp. U sc , where U resp. U sc denotes the set of weakly resp. strictly concave and strictly increasing Von NeumannMorgenstern preferences, such that c solves maxfuc + x : c w 0 g: This is the same de nition as in the frictionless case except that the budget constraint is in terms of the sublinear pricing rule ;which is the maximum of a family of nonnegative linear pricing rules. Hence, the budget constraint c w 0 is a collection of linear budget constraints Ec w 0 ;
for all E in K: Also, since agents have strictly increasing preferences, an e cient contingent claim c makes the budget constraint binding and the initial wealth w 0 for which it is an optimal choice must be equal to c : Also, in frictionless complete markets the optimal consumption problem maxfuc + x : c w 0 g can beseparated in two steps 9 : rst hedge the 7 Most results go through unchanged if states of the world are not assumed to be equiprobable, except that state prices must be normalized by actual probabilities in all statements. Also, if we view the nite model as an approximation for continuous distributions this assumption can be made without loss of generality.
8 We exclude state-dependent preferences although we allow uncertain future endowments. 9 Indeed the problem maxfuc+x:cw0g can be written maxfuc:c,xw0g; wherec denotes net uncertain future endowment x; which provides an amount x; and then solve for the optimal net consumption bundlec subject to the budget constraint c w 0 +x: Hence, changing the uncertain future endowment i s equivalent t o c hanging the initial wealth. This means that the set of optimal net consumption bundles is una ected by the presence of an uncertain future endowment, and that any trading strategy can be rationalized by assuming a particular uncertain future endowment. This is no longer true in the presence of market frictions, where we have Theorem 2.1 : Given an uncertain future endowment x = x 1 ; : : : ; x n 2 R n ; a contingent claim c = c 1 ; : : : ; c n 2 R n is resp. strictly e cient if and only if there exists E = e 1 ; : : : ; e n 2 K; the set of underlying linear pricing rules, such that i E prices c ; i.e. E c = c ; ii c + x is in resp. strict reverse order of E ; i.e. c i + x i c j + x j implies e i e j for all i; j = 1 ; : : : ; n resp. c i + x i c j + x j implies e i e j for all i; j = 1 ; : : : ; n . This says that a contingent claim is e cient if and only if it gives the right to at least as much net consumption in cheaper" -according to a positive linear pricing rule that prices it -states of the world. If there are no market frictions there exists a unique linear pricing rule and we nd that a consumption bundle is e cient if and only if it entitles to at least as much net consumption in cheaper" -according to the unique linear pricing rule -states of the world, i.e. if it is the cheapest consumption bundle with its distribution Dybvig 1988a .
Roughly speaking, this characterization follows from the rst-order conditions: marginal utilities of consumption must be proportional to the linear pricing rule corresponding to one of the binding linear budget constraints. From the assumption that agents are risk-averse, marginal utilities are decreasing, which implies that net consumption must be higher in cheaper according to the binding linear pricing rule states of the world. The diculty, however, is that we are dealing with a continuum of constraints. This Theorem generalizes the price characterizations obtained by P eleg and Yaari 1975 and by Dybvig and Ross 1982 in the incomplete markets case. 10 consumption, and since is linear in this case it is equivalent to maxfuc:cw0+xg:
At this point we are able to appreciate the impact of market frictions on the e ciency of a contingent claim c : Market frictions enlarge the set of underlying linear pricing rules from a single one to a continuum. This makes it easier to satisfy part ii, i.e. nd a linear pricing rule that is in reverse order of the net consumption bundle c + x: However, it makes it harder to satisfy part i, i.e. this linear pricing rule must price c : Therefore, market frictions do not always make ine cient strategies become e cient o r e cient strategies become ine cient: both situations can happen. Indeed, as market frictions increase investors move a way from trading strategies that are optimally diversi ed over time -but have higher costs -towards strategies that have lower costs but are less than optimally diversi ed, and if costs are higher than any potential diversi cation bene ts the set of e cient trading strategies shrinks to not trading at all see section 3.
For instance, from Theorem 2.1 we see that the strategy that consists in hedging the uncertain future endowment x by duplicating the contingent claim ,x is not necessarily e cient. Indeed, there might not even be any strictly positive measure in K that prices it. 11 However, we have Remark 2.1 : Given an uncertain future endowment x 2 R n ; duplicating the contingent claim ,x is an e cient strategy if and only if there exists E 2 K; the set of underlying linear pricing rules, that is strictly positive and prices ,x; i.e. is such that ,x = E,x: In particular, this will be the case when frictions are su ciently small so that all the underlying linear pricing rules in K are strictly positive.
Ine ciency size
If a contingent claim is found to beine cient we would like to evaluate the size of its ine ciency, i.e. have a measure of how far it is from being optimal. We propose the following De nition 2.2 : The ine ciency cost" of a contingent claim c 2 R n ; given an uncertain future endowment x 2 R n ; is the di erence c ,V x c ; where V x c = sup u2U fmin c fc : uc + x uc + xgg denotes the utility price" of c :
Indeed, V x c is the largest amount that is required by rational agents with an uncertain future endowment x in order to get the same utility level as with the consumption bundle c : Hence, c , V x c ; which is equal to inf u2U fc , min c fc : uc + x uc + xgg; is the smallest discrepancy, across all rational agents with future endowment x; between the cost of obtaining c and the price at which it would be an optimal choice. Also, we have c V x c ; i.e. our measure of ine ciency is always nonnegative.
Moreover, if c is e cient then V x c = c and our measure of ine ciency is equal to zero. Also note that this measure of ine ciency does not depend on the choice of a speci c utility function.
In dynamically complete frictionless markets the utility price of a contingent claim coincides with the minimum cost of achieving the same distribution of consumption see Dybvig 1988a , and e ciency is equivalent to cost minimization of achieving a distribution of consumption. Even though e ciency always implies cost minimization, the converse in not true in imperfect markets see the Example in the appendix. Hence, in looking for a cost characterization of our measure of ine ciency we shall consider the set of consumption bundles that are equal to or larger than a convex combination of consumption bundles with a given distribution. We then have Lemma : For every consumption bundlec 2 R n we have fc : uc uc; 8u 2 U resp.U sc g = f convex hull of the bundles distributed ascg + R n + : Note that this is a new alternative c haracterization of second-order stochastic dominance see Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970 for other characterizations. This allows us to prove Theorem 2.2 : Given an uncertain future endowment x 2 R n ; for every contingent claim c 2 R n the utility price of c ; satis es 12 iV x c = minfc , x : c is a conv. comb. of bundles distributed as c + xg = minfc : uc + x uc + x for all u 2 U resp. U sc g ii V x c = maxfP x c ; E : E 2 Kg; where P x c ; E = minfEc , x : c is distributed as c + xg = P 0 c + x; E , Ex is the utility price of c in the frictionless economy de ned by the linear pricing rule E ;and K is the set of underlying linear pricing rules associated to :Hence, max E2K P 0 c + x; E , x V x c max E2K P 0 c + x; E + ,x
iii V x c = maxf
where K is the set of underlying linear pricing rules associated t o ;Fcz is the probability that the random variablec is less than or equal to z and similarly for F E , and F ,1 y = minfz : Fz yg for all y 2 0; 1 is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function F:
Part i says that the utility price V x c of the contingent claim c is equal to the cost of the cheapest claim that leads to a net consumption bundle distributed as c +x or that is a convex combination of consumption bundles distributed as c +x: Note that this implies that given a future endowment x; V x c only depends on the distribution of net consumption c +x: It also says that V x c is equal to the cost of the cheapest contingent claim that makes every rational agent at least as happy as with the net consumption bundle c + x: Note that in the frictionless case, because the pricing rule is linear, the minimum minfc, x : c i s a c onvex combination of bundles distributed as c +xg is attained for a consumption bundle that has the same distribution as c +x: Hence the utility price coincides with the minimum cost of achieving a given distribution of net consumption. In imperfect markets though, this minimum is only attained for convex combinations of consumption bundles that have the same distribution as c + x:
Part ii is analogous to Proposition 2.1 which says that c is the largest of the prices of c for the underlying linear pricing rules in K : V x c is the largest of the utility prices of c in the underlying frictionless economies. Moreover, if there is no uncertain future endowment i.e. if x = 0, V 0 c is the largest of the distributional prices of c in the underlying frictionless economies. This implies 13 that if we can nd a consumption bundlec with the same distribution as c + x and that is in reverse order of a linear pricing ruleẼ in K that pricesc , x; then the utility price of c is equal to V x c = c , x = Ec , x:
Note that unlike in frictionless markets, in the presence of market frictions it can happen that even though a claim is not e cient, its ine ciency cost is nonetheless equal to zero. However, as can readily be seen from the de nition, the fact that a contingent claim has a zero ine ciency cost implies that it is arbitrarily close from being an optimal choice for some rational agents. Moreover, we have the following price characterization: Theorem 2.3 : Given an uncertain future endowment x 2 R n ; the ineciency cost c , V x c of a contingent claim c = c 1 ; : : : ; c n 2 R n ; is equal to zero if and only if there exists E = e 1 ; : : : ; e n 2 K; such that i E prices c ; i.e. E c = c ; ii c + x is in reverse order of E ; i.e. c i + x i c j + x j implies e i e j for all i; j = 1 ; : : : ; n :
Note that this is almost the characterization of e cient contingent claims obtained in Theorem 2.1, except that the linear pricing rule E does not need to be strictly positive. 14 For instance, we have Remark 2.2 : Given an uncertain future endowment x 2 R n ; the minimum cost strategies that dominate ,x have a zero ine cient cost.
13 Indeed, by Theorem 2.2 ii w e h a ve Vxc Pxc ;Ẽ=P0c +x;Ẽ,Ẽx=Ẽc,Ẽx=Ẽc,x=c,x and by Theorem 2.2 i w e h a ve Vxc c,x:
14 If the set of underlying linear pricing rules K has a nite number of extreme points which is the case in most models with a nite number of periods and states of the world, and all the examples in this paper, we also have that a contingent claim c 2R n is strictly e cient if and only if it is the unique solution of minfc:c+ x is at least equal to a convex combination of claims distributed as c +xg: The assumption is needed to avoid situations where marginal rates of substitution are required to be unbounded at the optimum. One could expand the set of utility functions to lexicographic or hyperreal-valued utility functions, as in Blume et al. 1991a and 1991b , which allow in nite marginal rates of substitution. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
This means that as extreme as it may seem in some speci c cases 15 dominating the uncertain future endowment, while minimizing the cost of doing so, cannot be ruled out on e ciency grounds only: it is a well-diversi ed strategy albeit one may rule out the preferences that rationalize" it.
Arbitage bounds and utility bounds
As a consequence of Theorem 2.3 we also have Corollary 2.1 : For every contingent claim c 2 R n ; we have maxfV x c : x 2 R n g = c :
This means that even though for a given uncertain future endowment x the utility upper bound" V x c might bestrictly lower than the arbitrage upper bound c and the utility l o wer bound" ,V x ,c might be strictly higher than the arbitrage lower bound ,,c ; the widest range of utility bounds" across all possible uncertain future endowments coincides with the interval of arbitrage bounds. Hence, if neither preferences nor endowments are observable, e ciency arguments do not lead to tighter bounds on the price of a contingent claim c than the simple arbitrage bounds c and ,,c :
In order to achieve tighter bounds, further restrictions on preferences and or endowments are necessary.
Portfolio performance
In this section, we apply the results of the previous sections to the measure of portfolio performance. As in Dybvig 1988a, in measuring performance we follow the tradition of comparing some investment strategy -and its distribution of payo s -to the alternative of trading in a given securities market: the benchmark market. However, we do not assume that it is frictionless, and because of this we have to take the uncertain future endowment into account since investment and hedging decisions can no longer beseparated. Ignoring these frictions would make the benchmark market available to investors more attractive than it actually is. This e ect is mitigated by the fact that the investment strategy itself is subject to the same frictions. The previous results will allow u s to evaluate the net e ect.
Given an uncertain future endowment x; an investment strategy is evaluated on the basis of the distribution F c+x of its net payo c + x, where c might depend on information not available to the agents but only to the portfolio manager, allowing for information-trading and private investments outside the benchmark market. The benchmark market is described by the set K of underlying linear pricing rules that summarize the investment opportunities that are available. ii If w 0 = V x c; we have ordinary performance, i.e. every rational agent with concave and strictly increasing Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences weakly prefers trading in the benchmark market to receiving the distribution of payo s F c+x : However, the lowest amount such a rational agent would pay to switch is equal to zero.
iii If w 0 V x c; we have inferior performance, i.e. every rational agent with concave and strictly increasing Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences strictly prefers trading in the benchmark market to receiving the distribution of payo s F c+x : Moreover, the lowest amount such a rational agent would pay to switch is w 0 , V x c 0. 16 Hence, by comparing the initial investment required by an investment strategy to the utility price of the distribution of its payo we can evaluate its performance. If the utility price is lower than the initial investment, the portfolio is not well-diversi ed and is underperforming. If the utility price is equal to the initial investment, the portfolio is well-diversi ed and it is performing as it should. If the utility price is larger than the initial investment, the manager has superior ability and or information, and or is subject to lower transaction costs, and the portfolio is overperforming.
As argued in Dybvig 1988a this provides an alternative to the Security Market Line SML in measuring portfolio performance. As opposed to the SML analysis, this alternative gives a correct evaluation even when superior performance is due to private information. Indeed, the SML is based on mean-variance analysis, 17 and even if securities returns are assumed to be jointly normally distributed, they will typically not be normal once conditioned on information see Dybvig and Ross 1985 . 
Examples and numerical results
In this section we examine examples of a multiperiod economy the binomial economy where agents can trade a riskless asset, paying a continuously compounded interest rate r; and a risky asset that follows a multiplicative binomial process with an initial value S0 and an actual probability of 1 2 of going up" by u = exp T n + q T n or down" by d = exp T n , q T n each period and at each node, where T denotes the length of the investment horizon, and n the numberof periods. We shall assume that j , rj q T n to ensure the absence of arbitrage. In this example all states of the world are equiprobable and the results of section 2 apply. It is well-known that this binomial process converges as the number of periods n goes to in nity to a geometric Brownian Motion process with drift instantaneous expected return + 1 2 2 and volatility see Cox, Ross and Rubinstein 1979 . 3.1 Bid-ask spreads: proportional transaction costs
In this example transacting in the risky asset is costly, and the transaction cost is proportional to the quantity transacted. If one share of the risky asset is worth S at a given time and state of the world, we assume that it can be bought for 1 + S and can besold for 1 , S : the bid-ask spread per share is equal to 2S; where is a nonnegative constant. We assume that the risky asset has a nonnegative expected excess return i.e. u+d 2 expr T n , i.e. the risk-neutral probability p u of going up" from each node is less than or equal to 0:5:
Even for very small but strictly positive ; the strategy that consists in dynamically duplicating a call option on the risky asset for any strike price P is ine cient when n is large. In the frictionless economy where = 0 by Theorem 2.1 the e cient consumption bundles are those that are in the same order as the price of the risky asset since p u 0:5. This means that if the price of the risky asset is higher in a state of the world than in another, so is the payo of any e cient consumption bundle. Since the payo of a call option with strike price P and physical delivery is equal to c = maxf1 , ST , P;0g at its expiration date, it satis es this requirement. However, the trading strategy that duplicates this payo requires frequent portfolio rebalancing: if 0 it can beshown see Soner et al. 1995 that as the number of periods n grows to in nity the total cost incurred is at least equal to the cost 1 + S0 of purchasing one share of the risky asset at the initial date. Since the payo of this investment strategy is 1 , ST at the nal date T ;it strictly dominates the payo of the call option. This shows that duplicating the call option is ine cient, regardless of its strike price, as long as 0: Note that by Theorem 2.2 the utility price" V 0 c of any consumption bundle c is at most equal to exp,rTE1 2 c ; the present value of its expected value with respect to the actual probability measure. 18 Hence, the ine ciency cost of c satis es c ,V 0 c c ,exp,rTE1 2 c ; where c denotes the minimum cost of achieving or dominating c : In our example when n goes to in nity this means c , V 0 c 1 + S0 , exp,rTE1 2 maxfST , P;0g:
For example, if = 0 :1; r = 6 ; = 20; + 1 2 2 = 12; P = S0; and T = 1 y ear, then the ine ciency cost of hedging an at-the-money call option is at least equal to 83:99 of the value of the underlying risky asset, an enormous amount. Nevertheless, the cheapest hedging strategy for that call 18 Indeed, since after normalizing by exprT w e h a ve V0c =minfc:c2c g; where c is the set of convex combination of contingent claims distributed as c ; and since E1 In this case, if is equal to 3 or more this condition is satis ed and the only strategy that is e cient consists in investing in the riskless asset. To put this numberinto prospective, Amihud and Mendelson 1991 report that the typical bid-ask spread on Treasury Notes and Bonds is roughly equal to 0:03 of face value, i.e. = 0:015: On the other hand, Sharpe 1987 reports an average bid-ask spread of 0:52 for large capitalization stocks larger than 1:5 billion dollars, up to 6:55 for small capitalization stocks smaller than 10 million dollars. When the typical commission rate of 1 charged by retail brokers is taken into account this means that averages from 1:25 to 4:25 for stocks, depending on their size.
Short selling costs Di erent borrowing and lending rates
In this example the risky asset has no bid-ask spread and it can besold short, but it costs an annualized percentage c of the asset value to do so over any period of time see Tuckman and Vila 1992 . To model this situation we assume that the risky asset cannot be held in negative quantities and we introduce a shadow risky assetS that cannot beheld in positive quantities and that has a higher expected return:S0 = S0;ũ = exp+c T n + q T n andd = exp + c T n , q T n : We shall analyze the e ciency of a stoploss trading strategy by an investor who expects the risky asset to have a negative excess return i.e. , r + 1 2 2 0 and sells it short, but liquidates the position if unexpected 19 losses exceed a given threshold percentage of the initial investment. This is plausible if investors disagree on the actual probability distribution of returns of the risky asset. Note that the short interest on the NYSE averaged about 3:5 billion shares in 1997, almost 2 of the total number of shares listed, more than 6 time the average daily volume, 20 and according to Engel and Boyd 1983, chap . 22 short selling normally accounts for 6 to 8 of transactions. 21 We have by Theorem 2.2 Remark 3.2 : The utility price of any contingent claim c is equal to V 0 c = E c wherec is distributed as c and is in reverse order of E ; the probability measure such that the conditional probability of going up" at each selling is costless we nd that the ine ciency cost of the stop-loss strategy is equal to 0:28 see Dybvig 1988b , but if the short selling cost is equal to c = 1 it is reduced to 0:2; and it is totally eliminated if the short selling cost is as high as c = 4 : More generally we have by Theorem 2.1 Remark 3.3 : The stop-loss strategy is e cient if and only if the cost c of short selling the risky asset is equal to , , r + 1 2 2 ; i.e. to the negative of its expected excess return over the riskless rate. This means that if the short selling costs are high enough they rationalize strategies such as stop-loss that are ine cient in frictionless markets. 22 To put these costs into prospective note that short selling a speci c stock requires posting a 50 initial margin, and that the proceeds from the short sale are typically not available to the investor although large institutional investors are generally able to negotiate a much lower rental fee, it tends to increase sharply with the desirability of the short sale. 23 In this case, c = r; which is equal to 8 in our example. In the bond market, short 20 See The Wall Street Journal, June 22, 1998, page C12. 21 Arguably, a good portion of the short positions have hedging motives in situations such as mergers and acquisitions, the purchase of options or convertible securities, and tax management.
22 We w ould obtain exactly the same result for other strategies studied in Dybvig 1988b such a s l o c k-in strategies and rolled-over portfolio insurance.
23 See Rubinstein 1985, p. 50, and Sharpe 1987, p. 34. sales are performed through repurchase agreements in which the short seller lends money at the repo rate and takes the bond as collateral. If the bond is special", meaning that it is particularly hard to borrow -which i s t ypically the case for the most liquid benchmark bonds -its repo rate can besharply lower than the repo rate on general collateral. The short selling cost c is then the sum of the bid-ask spread on the repo rate, and the di erence between the repo rate and the repo on general collateral. Stigum 1983 reports typical values of c between 0:25 and 0:65; but we can have c = r if the bond is impossible to borrow and the short seller is forced to fail on its delivery. Since this is likely to happen when the bond has outperformed, stop-loss strategies are plausibly rationalized by such shortselling costs.
We can similarly analyze the case where the borrowing rate is higher than the riskless lending rate net of the ex-ante probability of default. This can occur because of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, and the inability of good borrowers to di erentiate themselves from bad ones. We examine a stop-loss strategy that consists in borrowing some amount at the initial date and investing it in the risky asset, liquidating the position whenever unexpected losses exceed a given threshold fraction of the initial investment. If T = 1 y ear, r = 8 ; + 1 2 2 , r = 10; = 20; and = 10; when there are no borrowing costs we nd that the ine ciency cost of the stop-loss strategy is equal to 0:79; but if the borrowing cost is equal to 3 it is reduced to 0:49; and it is totally eliminated if the cost is as high as 10: Again, we nd that this strategy is rationalized by borrowing costs equal to the expected excess return of the risky asset + 1 2 2 , r:
To put these borrowing costs into prospective, note that individual investors can borrow with their home as collateral at a spread of roughly 1; that they typically pay a spread of 2:5 to borrow against their stock holdings, and a spread of the order of 10 on their credit card balance uncollateralized borrowing. As far as corporations are concerned, the spread at which they can borrow t ypically depends on their leverage. For instance, the average spread at which AAA companies can borrow is roughly 0:4 whereas it is roughly 5:5 for B companies 24 . According to Standard & Poor's Credit Week November 8, 1993, p. 41-2 the median total debt as a percentage of capitalization was 21:9 for AAA companies and 65:9 for B companies during the three-year period 1990-1992. In order to take these stylized facts into account we assume that leverage is observable and that it enables borrowers to partially di erentiate themselves. Suppose that the borrowing cost is equal to a + bR with a = 0 :5 and b = 3 ; where R is the debt-to-equity ratio. In this case, the stop-loss strategy is rationalized by such borrowing costs if the liquidation threshold is equal to 50 or higher.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a general price characterization of ecient i.e. optimal for at least one rational agent with concave and strictly increasing Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences consumption bundles in arbitrage-free multiperiod economies with market frictions. The opportunity set in such economies can be characterized in terms of a sublinear pricing rule that is the maximum of a convex set of underlying frictionless nonnegative linear pricing rules. We h a ve shown that a contingent claim is e cient if and only if it gives the right to at least as much net consumption in cheaper" states of the world, where cheaper" is meant with respect to an underlying linear pricing rule that prices" the contingent claim. We h a ve then de ned a conservative measure of the potential ine ciency of a contingent claim as the di erence between its minimum cost to achieve and the maximum amount i t would cost any rational agent to get at least the same utility level the utility price", which does not depend on any speci c utility function. We h a ve shown that the utility price coincides with the distributional price" i.e. the minimum amount it costs to obtain the same distribution of consumption in frictionless economies, but that it is in general smaller in economies with market frictions, and that it is equal to the minimum amount it costs to obtain the same distribution of consumption or a convex combination of consumption bundles with the same distribution. Furthermore, we have proved that it is not possible to tighten the arbitrage bounds on a contingent claim to consumption based on e ciency arguments without restricting preferences or endowments. Also, we have exploited these results to propose a measure of portfolio performance in imperfect markets without relying on strong assumptions on preferences such as the Security Market Line analysis. We h a ve then applied these results to commonly used trading and hedging strategies in the presence of di erent borrowing and lending rates due to asymmetries of information, short selling costs, and bid-ask spreads. We have given examples of e cient trading strategies that become ine cient with market frictions, as well as examples of ine cient strategies that are rationalized by market frictions. Indeed, the presence of market frictions genarally changes and tends to shrink the set of e cient strategies, shifting investors away from diversi ed investment strategies into low cost strategies, and for large costs into no trading at all. Appendix First, recall that for a convex function F : ! R, where is an open subset of R n , the subgradient o f F at x 2 is de ned by @Fx = fp 2 R n : py,x Fy,Fx for all y 2 g: Furthermore, following Clarke 1983, Theorem 2.5.1 we have that @Fx is the convex hull of flim n!1 F 0 x n : x n converges to x and F is di erentiable at x n g: For a concave function G we de ne @Gas ,@,G. Example : Ine cient Distributions of Returns Consider a two-period economy with two equiprobable states of the world, up" and down". We shall assume that the riskless rate is equal to zero this is merely a normalization and that investors can buy and sell a risky asset that pays o S u in state up" and S Note that this example is not a degenerate one. Both consumption bundles c u ; c d and c d ; c u are in the opportunity set and neither of them is dominated by a consumption bundle that costs the same amount to obtain. 25 Moreover, for any given set of payo s S u and S d for the risky asset we can nd a transaction cost large enough to make any distribution of consumption other than the riskless one i.e. c u = c d ine cient. And if there is any positive bid-ask spread around an initial price of Su+S d 2 for the risky asset then the only e cient distribution of consumption is the riskless one.
Proof of Proposition 2.1 : See Jouini 1999. Proof of Theorem 2.1 : We shall treat here the case where the uncertain future endowment x is equal to zero. The case where x 6 = 0 is an immediate extension. First, note that by Proposition 2.1 and following Clarke 1983, Theorem 2.8.6 @x is de ned for all x 2 R n and @x f E 2 K : Ex = xg: Moreover, if c is e cient resp. strictly e cient, there exists u 2 U resp. u 2 U sc such that c solves maxfuc : c c g; and by Rock- If instead we de ne Pc by Pc = fc : uc uc ; for all u 2 U sc g; let U q : R ! R bede ned by U q x = Ux , 1 q exp,x; for every positive integer q:Since U is concave and strictly increasing U q is strictly concave and strictly increasing for every positive integer q:Hence, the utility function u q c = 1 n U q c 1 + : : : + U q c n ; for all c 2 R n ; belongs to U sc for every positive integer q:Moreover since uc uc we have u q c u q c for q su ciently large, which contradicts the fact that c 2 P c and concludes the proof. uc uc g = minfc : for all u 2 U ; u c uc g:
Let us now turn to the more general case where K is not reduced to a singleton the case with market frictions. Let Wc = sup In order to conclude the proof of footnote 17 we also need E to be positive and in strict reverse order of c : Suppose rst that E is in fact in strict reverse order of c : We are going to show that in this case we can constructẼ that is also in strict reverse order of c and that is strictly positive. Indeed, suppose that assuming, without loss of generality, that E is in nondecreasing order we h a ve e 1 = : : : = e k = 0 and 0 e k+1 : : : e n for some n k 1: Since c is in strict reverse order of E we then have have that c = E c = E c 0 = c 0 and again a contradiction or we obtain a strictly positive measureẼ 2 K that is in strict reverse order of c and prices it. Indeed, if E c 0 c 0 then there is a measure in K that is identical to E but puts more weight o n c 1 = : : : = c k and less weight o n t h e c j 's such that c j = c k+1 and j k + 1 : We can then construct by convexity of KẼ 2 K that prices c ; is still in strict reverse order of c and is such thatẽ 1 ;ẽ 2 ; : : : ; or e k is strictly positive andẽ j 0 for j k : Repeating this reasoning k times at most we obtainẼ that is strictly positive, in strict reverse order of c and prices it. To conclude the proof, we only need to show that there exists a measure E 2 K that prices c and is in strict reverse order of c : Let A = fx : c +x c g and B = fx : c +x 2 c g note that 0 is an extreme point o f B. Since K has a nite number of extreme points, is polyhedral and A is polyhedral. Since 0 belongs to A, the convex cone A 0 generated by A is then closed see Rockafellar 1970, Theorem 19-7 . Let B 0 be the convex cone generated by B;since 0 belongs to B which is polyhedral B 0 is closed. It is also easy to show that B 0 ,B 0 = f0g; and this implies that there exists an a ne hyperplane H such that 0 = 2 H;B = H B 0 is compact and B 0 is the convex cone generated byB see Bourbaki 1981, chapter II-7-3 . Moreover, it is easy to show that A 0 B 0 = ; and hence that A 0 B = ;: Moreover, since A 0 is closed andB is compact there exists 0 such that B + B0; A 0 = ; where B0; is the closed ball of center 0 and radius . NoteB =B + B0; and let B 0 be the cone generated byB : SinceB is convex and compact and does not contain 0; then B 0 is a closed convex cone, and it is easy to show that A 0 B 0 = f0g: Moreover, by construction B 0 has a nonempty i n terior and we h a ve 0 = 2 intB 0 and hence intB 0 A 0 = ;: Hence, by Eidelheit separation Theorem, there exists a nonzero linear map f such that for all a; b 2 A 0 B 0 ; f a 0 fb see Luenberger 1969 . This means that if E i c + x c for every extreme point E i of K then fx 0: In other words, if E i c + x , c e 0 for every extreme point E i of K then fc + x , c e fc , c fe where e is the vector with all components equal to one. Since f is bounded above on a cone it is necessarily bounded by 0 and by F arkas' Lemma we h a ve that f is a nonnegative linear combination of the nite extreme points of K and fc ,c fe 0: Renormalizing f if necessary, f then belongs to K and fc c ; which implies fc = c this means that f prices c . Now let b a nonzero vector of B; since B 0 is the cone generated byB;there existsb 2B and a real number 0 such that b = b and Bb; B 0 : Hence f is nonnegative on Bb; and since f 6 = 0 we must have fb 0 and therefore fb 0. Since f0 = 0; f attains its minimum on B 0 at 0 only. This shows that f attains its minimum on c at the point c only, which implies that f is in strict reverse order of c and concludes the proof of footnote 17.
Proof of Remark 2.2 : Let the payo ,x ,x of a minimum cost strategy that dominates ,x: This means ,x = ,x: If E 2 K prices ,x we have ,x = E ,x E ,x ,x which implies ,x = ,x = E ,x = E ,x; i.e. E prices ,x as well. Hence E assigns a zero price to the states of the world where ,x strictly dominates ,x: Since ,x + x equals zero in the other states, E is in reverse order of ,x + x: By Theorem 2.3 this shows that the minimum cost dominating strategy has no ine ciency cost.
Proof of Corollary 2.1 : We have V x c c by De nition 2.2.
Moreover, V ,c c = c : Indeed, any pricing rule in K that prices c is in reverse order of the net contingent claim equal to zero and hence, by Theorem 2.3, c has a zero ine cient cost given an uncertain future endowment ,c :
Proof of Corollary 2.2 : This is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.2. Proof of Remark 3.1 : We shall assume that all prices and payo s at time t have been normalized by exprt: Denote by E1 2 the expectation with respect to the actual probability measure with conditional probability 0:5 of going up" from each node in the tree. Using the inequalities satis ed by we h a ve, for every date t and every node !t; we h a ve 1 ,St E1 2 1,ST j !t 1 + St or 1 , St E1 2 1 + ST j !t 1 + St:
This proves that E1 2 belongs to K:
We u,d ; where N is the total number of nodes in the tree except the terminal ones. K is the set of probability measures de ned by conditional probabilities of the up" state that are not larger than 1 2 and belong to 1 ; 2 1 , 2 ; 1 , 1 : By Theorem 2.2 ii we have V c = maxfP c ; E : E 2 Kg; where Pc ; E = minfEc : c is distributed as c g: We then have V c = maxfP c ; E : E 2 K g; since we can reorder c to match the switch in conditional probabilities from the "up" state to the "down" state, without changing its distribution. We are now going to prove that E ;c is a saddle point, wherec is a permutation of c which i is in reverse order of E ; and ii whenever two states of the world have the same numberof ups" and hence the same weights for the probability measure E c has a weakly higher payo in the state that is higher up" in the tree. This means that we shall prove that E ;c satis es Ec E c E c for every c distributed as c and every E 2 K ; and this will prove V c = E c: Note that as far as computing V c is concerned we can use anyc that is in reverse order of E since they all give the same value for E c: Also, E c E c follows immediately from i. In order to prove Ec E c for all E 2 K ; we shall proceed by backward induction and prove it for the expectations conditioned on each node. Let E 2 K ; then the inequality on the conditional expectations obviously holds at the nal date. Proof of Remark 3.3 : It is easy to see that when c = ,,r + 1 2 2 the linear pricing rule with equal prices for all states of the world is in K;and is equal to E of Remark 3.2. Since the stop-loss strategy only involves short selling the risky asset and investing in the riskless asset, it is easy to show that this linear pricing rule prices its payo . It then follows from Remark 3.2 and Theorem 2.1 that the stop-loss strategy is e cient.
